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Note
PORTERFIELD V. MASCARI H, INC.:
"A CLEAR MANDATE OF PUBLIC POLICY" REMAINS
UNCLEAR IN MARYLAND'S WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE JURISPRUDENCE
In Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered whether terminating an at-will employee who wanted to
consult with an attorney regarding an employment dispute violates
public policy, thereby giving the employee grounds upon which to
state a claim for wrongful discharge.2 The court held that a general
right to counsel is not a clear mandate of public policy sufficient to
support a wrongful discharge claim.' Thus, finding no exception to
the at-will employment rule, the court concluded that the employee
had failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge.4
In so holding, the court adhered to the narrow interpretation of
the public policy exception that was articulated when the tort of
wrongful discharge first was recognized in Maryland.5 However, by
failing to ground its reasoning in this narrow approach, the court
missed an opportunity to clarify the scope of the wrongful discharge
exception to the at-will employment rule and establish a manageable
standard for the resolution of wrongful discharge claims.6 The court
compounded this error by mischaracterizing precedent and failing to
address the lurking question of whether a public policy that secures
individual rights against the state is properly vindicated by a wrongful
discharge action against a private employer.7 In the wake of Porterfield
II, litigants in wrongful discharge actions are likely to have difficulty
predicting when a court will recognize a clear mandate of public pol-
L. 374 Md. 402, 823 A.2d 590 (2003) [hereinafter Porterfield I].
2. Id. at 408, 823 A.2d at 593.
3. Id. at 429, 823 A.2d at 606.
4. Id. at 429-30, 823 A.2d at 606.
5. See infra notes 149-161 and accompanying text (discussing the consistency of
Porterfield II with Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) [hereinafter
Adler 1], in which the Court of Appeals first recognized the tort of wrongful discharge).
6. See infra notes 162-190 and accompanying text (discussing the court's failure to
clarify when a clear mandate of public policy has been violated and the situations in which
a terminated employee may state a claim).
7. See infta notes 180-190 and accompanying text (discussing the court's mischaracter-
ization of Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 803 A.2d 482 (2002), and its failure to fore-
close claims based on rights that restrict the state rather than private actors).
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icy sufficient to support a claim of wrongful discharge.8 Additionally,
courts are likely to be inconsistent in determining whether a clear
mandate of public policy has been violated.9
I. THE CASE
In December of 1997, Deborah Porterfield was hired as an at-will
employee l ° by Home Instead, a Rockville franchise that provides in-
home non-medical services.'1 In 1999, the employment relationship
soured.' 2 Porterfield had a series of difficulties with co-worker Julie
Elseroad and was reprimanded by Home Instead manager Patricia
Mascari for failing to comply with company policy. 3 Porterfield's dif-
ficulties culminated with an "Employee Warning Report" in which she
was informed that she would be terminated if her job performance
did not improve.1 4 Upon Mascari's request that Porterfield sign the
report, Porterfield said that she wanted to take the document home
and review it.15 The following day, Porterfield called Elseroad and
told her that she believed that the warning report was libelous and
wanted to consult legal counsel before responding to it.16 Later that
day, Mascari called Porterfield and fired her.' 7 Mascari allegedly told
Porterfield that Elseroad had informed Mascari of Porterfield's desire
8. See infra notes 162-222 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal instability
and confusion that remains in the wake of Porterfield I).
9. See infra notes 163-222 and accompanying text (predicting that the court's failure
to articulate a clear standard to govern wrongful discharge claims, mischaracterization of
precedent, and failure to make clear what policies are sufficient to support a wrongful
discharge claim will cause courts difficulty).
10. An employee is an at-will employee if she is hired for an indefinite duration. Adler
v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981). An employer may termi-
nate an at-will employee at any time, for any reason, or for no reason, subject to certain
statutory and common law limitations. Id. at 35-36, 432 A.2d at 467.
11. Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 408, 823 A.2d 590, 593 (2003). Mascari,
Inc. and Mascari II, Inc. are corporations that operate the Home Instead franchise. Id. at
410 n.9, 823 A.2d at 594 n.9.
12. Id. at 409-10, 823 A.2d at 594-95.
13. Id. at 409, 823 A.2d at 594. The policy at issue was Mascari's directive that Home
Instead would not accept applications from potential care-givers residing in Prince
George's County. Id. Porterfield believed that this policy amounted to unlawful discrimi-
nation against aliens and non-whites. Appellant's Brief at 2-3, Porterfield v. Mascari II,
Inc., 374 Md. 402, 823 A.2d 590 (2003) (No. 14). However, the alleged unlawful nature of
the policy was not asserted as a basis for Porterfield's wrongful discharge claim. Porterfield
II, 374 Md. at 409 n.6, 823 A.2d at 594 n.6.
14. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 409, 823 A.2d at 594.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 410, 823 A.2d at 594.
17. Id.
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to consult an attorney, and then Mascari instructed Porterfield not to
return to work.'
8
Porterfield filed and later amended a five-count complaint
against Mascari, Inc.; Mascari II, Inc.; Patricia Mascari; andJulie Elser-
oad, in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County.19 The complaint
included a wrongful discharge claim against the corporations and Pa-
tricia Mascari as well as defamation and tortious interference claims
against all defendants.2z Porterfield sought six million dollars in com-
pensatory and punitive damages.2 The defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.22 The circuit court dismissed all counts with prejudice on
the grounds that the allegations in the complaint were not sufficiently
specific.23
Porterfield appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. 24 The only
issue on appeal was the wrongful discharge claim against the Mascari
corporations and Patricia Mascari. 25 Porterfield contended that her
claim for wrongful discharge was based on public policy in Maryland
supporting at-will employees' access to counsel without fear of
termination. 6
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit
court. 27 The court first surveyed the law of wrongful discharge in Ma-
ryland, noting the limited nature of the tort.2' The court explained
that a claim of wrongful discharge grounded in a violation of public
policy is only valid where the public policy asserted is a "preexisting,
unambiguous, and particularized pronouncement, by constitution,
enactment, or prior judicial decision, directing, prohibiting, or pro-
tecting the conduct in question. '' 29 The court also stated that judges
18. Id. at 410 n.8, 823 A.2d at 594 n.8.
19. Id. at 410, 823 A.2d at 594-95.
20. Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 142 Md. App. 134, 136-37 & n.2, 788 A.2d 242, 243 &
n.2 (2002) [hereinafter Porterfield 1].
21. Appellant's Brief at E9-E17, Porterfield II (No. 14).
22. Porterfield I, 374 Md. at 411, 823 A.2d at 595.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Porterfield 1, 142 Md. App. at 137 & n.2, 788 A.2d at 243 & n.2.
26. Id. at 139, 788 A.2d at 245.
27. Id. at 136, 788 A.2d at 243.
28. See id. at 140-41, 788 A.2d at 245-46 (noting the need for a clear mandate of public
policy and that the tort of wrongful discharge is available only when the employee has no
other remedy).
29. Id. at 140, 788 A.2d at 245.
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should be hesitant to recognize new public policy bases for wrongful
discharge claims because of the "nebulous" nature of public policy.30
The court concluded that the alleged violation of Porterfield's
general right to consult with an attorney was an insufficient basis for a
wrongful discharge claim, reasoning that Porterfield had improperly
equated this general right with the right to continued employment.
3
'
The court supported this assertion by citing two decisions where the
Court of Special Appeals similarly rejected the right of free speech as
a public policy basis for a wrongful discharge claim. 32 In these cases,
the employees were unable to point to any actual violation of the con-
stitutional guarantee of free speech.33
The court also analogized Porterfield's case to Watson v. Peoples
Security Life Insurance Co., 34 where the Court of Appeals announced
the rule that a wrongful discharge claim does not exist where an em-
ployee is terminated for suing her employer, absent a statute making
it unlawful for the employer to terminate the employee for bringing
the claim. 3' Applying this rule, the Court of Special Appeals found
that it was necessary to consider the particular legal claims that
Porterfield could bring against Mascari II.36 The court found that
Porterfield's only possible claim against the employer was a defama-
tion claim.3 7 Because there is no clear mandate of public policy bar-
ring an employer from terminating an employee who brings a
defamation claim against it, the court found that the Watson II rule
was controlling and that Porterfield's claim failed.3"
30. Id.
31. Id. at 141-42, 788 A.2d at 246.
32. Id. The court cited Miller v. Fairchild Industries, 97 Md. App. 324, 629 A.2d 1293
(1993), and Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Services, Inc., 98 Md. App. 123, 623 A.2d 463 (1993),
two cases in which the court held that an employee terminated for exercising the right of
free speech did not state a claim for wrongful termination. Miller, 97 Md. App. at 336, 629
A.2d at 1300; Bleich, 98 Md. App. at 135, 623 A.2d at 469. In Miller, the court noted that
"[t]he employee has a constitutional right to speak but not a constitutional right to remain
an employee." 97 Md. App. at 337, 629 A.2d at 1300. Underlying the court's adoption of
this line of reasoning is the understanding, expressed in Miller, that a public policy protect-
ing free speech or the right to counsel cannot be violated by a private employer because
such public policies restrict only the conduct of the government against a private party. 97
Md. App. at 336, 629 A.2d at 1300; Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp.
242, 244 (N.D. I1. 1983).
33. Miller, 97 Md. App. at 336, 629 A.2d at 1300; Bleich, 98 Md. App. at 134-35, 623 A.2d
at 468-69.
34. 322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) [hereinafter Watson II].
35. Id. at 478, 588 A.2d at 765.
36. Porterfield I, 142 Md. App. at 142, 788 A.2d at 246.
37. Id.
38. Id. The court distinguished Porterfield's case and Watson II from Ewing v. Koppers
Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988). In Ewing, the Court of Appeals found a wrongful
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Porterfield petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted certio-
rari to determine whether an employee terminated for expressing a
desire to consult with legal counsel before formally acknowledging a
negative performance review violates public policy such that she may
state a claim for wrongful discharge.3 9
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The At-Will Employment Doctrine and the
Wrongful Discharge Exception
The at-will employment doctrine is a common law rule that an
employee hired for an indefinite period may be terminated by his em-
ployer at any time, for any reason.4 ° Maryland has followed this rule
for over one hundred years.4 ' Numerous exceptions to this rule have
been created, most by legislative enactment. 42 The tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy is a judicially recognized
exception.
The public policy exception allows an employee whose termina-
tion violates a clear expression of public policy to maintain an action
for wrongful discharge against his former employer.44 At its inception
into the common law of Maryland, this exception was narrow.45 In
Adler v. American Standard Corp.,46 in which the Court of Appeals first
recognized the tort, it declined to find that the employee had stated a
claim for wrongful discharge.47 In early cases, the Court of Appeals
adhered to this narrow interpretation even when it arguably ex-
panded the reach of wrongful discharge claims, and it put in place
significant limitations on when this cause of action is available.48 The
discharge claim to exist where an employer, in clear violation of a criminal statute, termi-
nated an employee in retaliation for the employee filing a worker's compensation claim.
312 Md. at 50, 537 A.2d at 1175.
39. Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 408, 823 A.2d 590, 593 (2003).
40. Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981).
41. See McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 557, 11 A. 176, 178 (1887)
(noting that the at-will employment rule is the law in Maryland).
42. Adler 1, 291 Md. at 35, 432 A.2d at 467; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (1998)
(prohibiting employment decisions based on characteristics including race, religion, age,
national origin, and marital status).
43. Adler 1, 291 Md. at 35, 432 A.2d at 467.
44. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
45. See Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 609, 561 A.2d 179, 182 (1989)
(noting the "limited nature of the abusive discharge tort").
46. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
47. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
48. See infra notes 61-77 and accompanying text (discussing Ewing and Makovi).
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court has since further expanded the tort of wrongful discharge. 49 Al-
though the issue has not arisen in Maryland, other jurisdictions have
split on the question of whether the right to counsel is a sufficient
mandate of public policy on which to premise a wrongful discharge
claim.5° Finally, Maryland courts have rejected wrongful discharge
claims where employees have alleged violations of constitutional
rights by private employers. 5 1
B. The Narrow Public Policy Exception of Adler I
Adler I involved an employee who had discovered various impro-
prieties, some of which he thought to be illegal, within the American
Standard Corporation's Commercial Printing Division.52 The princi-
pal improprieties were the payment of commercial bribes and the fal-
sification of corporate records.53 When he was terminated after
expressing his intent to reveal these improprieties to the corporation's
management, Adler brought suit for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy. 54 As the public policy basis for his claim, Adler as-
serted that commercial bribery and falsification of corporate records
violated a criminal statute.55 Adler also asserted a more generalized
public policy basis; he claimed that because commercial bribery and
falsification of records are by nature contrary to public policy, he need
not point to any legal authority making such conduct unlawful.56
The Court of Appeals concluded that Adler had not sufficiently
alleged any criminal activity by his employer. 57 The court emphasized
49. See infta notes 78-105 and accompanying text (discussing Watson II, Molesworth, and
WMoLY).
50. See infra notes 106-116 and accompanying text (discussing the different results and
reasoning in cases where employees have premised wrongful discharge suits on alleged
violations of their right to counsel).
51. See infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of wrong-
ful discharge claims premised on alleged violations of constitutional rights against the
state).
52. Adler I, 291 Md. at 33, 432 A.2d at 466.
53. Id. at 43, 432 A.2d at 471.
54. Id. at 33-34, 432 A.2d at 466. Adler brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Federal District of Maryland. Id. at 32, 432 A.2d at 465. The district court certified
the questions of whether Maryland recognized the tort of wrongful discharge and whether
Adler stated a claim for wrongful discharge to the Court of Appeals. Id.
55. Id. at 43, 432 A.2d at 471.
56. Id. The Adler I court noted that while it may look beyond statutes, the common law,
and administrative regulations to discern public policy, courts should be judicious when
doing so. Adler I, 291 Md. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472. The court strongly cautioned that the
discernment of previously undeclared public policy requires a court to apply a "very nebu-
lous concept." Id. Moreover, the court noted that discerning public policy typically should
be the task of the legislature. Id
57. Id. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471.
610 [VOL. 63:605
2004] PORTERFIELD V. MASCARI II, INC.
that during oral argument, Adler's counsel could not say whether the
practices that Adler had alleged to be commercial bribery and falsifi-
cation of corporate records were in fact criminal acts." The court
rejected Adler's attempt to invoke a more generalized public policy
basis. 59 Despite its rejection of Adler's claim, however, the court held
that Maryland recognizes a cause of action for abusive discharge when
the discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy.6 °
C. "Expansion" of Wrongful Discharge to Cover Employees Discharged
for Exercising Statutory Rights
In Ewing v. Koppers Co.,6' the court recognized a cause of action
for an employee terminated in retaliation for exercising a statutory
right-his right to file a worker's compensation claim.62 This repre-
sented a narrow expansion of the tort of wrongful discharge. In Adler
I, the court noted that wrongful discharge actions should be available
in cases where the employee is discharged for refusing to commit an
illegal act or performing a statutorily prescribed duty, but it declined
to mention cases where the employee is terminated for exercising a
statutory right.6"
The Ewing court reasoned that discharging an employee for filing
a worker's compensation claim violated a clear mandate of public pol-
icy.64 The court did not have to look far to find this mandate, as it
58. Id.
59. See id. at 46-47, 432 A.2d at 472-73 (rejecting Adler's unsupported characterization
of what conduct constitutes commercial bribery and falsification of corporate records as a
basis for a finding that the public policy of Maryland has been violated).
60. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473. Although it recognized this new cause of action, the
court sought to limit it. The court warned against the adoption of a rule that would pre-
vent terminating an at-will employee whenever the termination seemed unwarranted to a
jury or court. Id. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470. The court surveyed the law of other jurisdictions,
and noted the recognition of wrongful discharge claims in cases where employees were
terminated for refusing to commit illegal acts, for performing important public duties, and
for exercising statutory rights. Id. at 37-39, 432 A.2d at 468-69. However, in determining
the scope of Maryland's public policy exception, the court declined to include cases where
the employee is terminated for exercising a statutory right. Id. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470.
61. 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988).
62. Id. at 50, 537 A.2d at 1175.
63. Adler I, 291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470.
64. Ewing, 312 Md. at 50, 537 A.2d at 1175. The court held that:
Discharging an employee solely because that employee filed a worker's compen-
sation claim contravenes the clear mandate of Maryland public policy. The Legis-
lature has made a strong statement to that effect in making such conduct a
criminal offense, and our perception of the magnitude of the public interest in
preserving the full benefits of the worker's compensation system to employees,
and deterring employers from encroaching upon those rights, is equally strong.
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noted the strong statement of the legislature, embodied in a statute
making the discharge a criminal act.65 Additionally, the court rea-
soned that a violation of this public policy would be vindicated by al-
lowing an employee to bring a wrongful discharge claim.66 The court
concluded that an employee's right to bring such a claim both pre-
serves the State's interest in protecting workers' rights to receive bene-
fits from the worker's compensation system and deters employers
from infringing on those rights.
6 7
D. A Significant Limitation: The Makovi Rule
After expanding the public policy exception in Ewing, the court
began to retract it in Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co."8 In Makovi, a
chemist employed at a paint factory alleged that she was terminated
because she became pregnant.69 The public policy grounds for
Makovi's claim were her employer's violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196470 and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices
Law,v' both of which prohibit employment discrimination based on
sex.7 2 Although the court recognized that the violation of these stat-
utes supplied the requisite violation of a clear mandate of public pol-
icy,73 it held that because these statutes provided remedies for their
violation, the tort of wrongful discharge was not available. 4 The
court did not base its holding on a finding that these statutes pre-
empted wrongful discharge actions; rather, the court based its hold-
ing on the inherently limited nature of the tort of wrongful
discharge. 75 The court asserted that the reason for recognizing the
tort was to provide a civil remedy for employees whose termination
amounted to a violation of public policy that would be left unremed-
ied if not for the availability of a tort action against the employer.76
65. Id. Article 101, section 39A of the Annotated Code of Maryland made it a crime to
discharge an employee for filing a worker's compensation claim. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§ 39A (1957) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-1105) (2004).
66. See Ewing, 312 Md. at 50, 537 A.2d at 1175 (noting the need to preserve full benefits
of the worker's compensation system and deter employers from discharging employees for
filing claims).
67. Id.
68. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989).
69. Id. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
71. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-18 (1998).
72. Makovi, 316 Md. at 607, 561 A.2d at 181.
73. Id. at 609, 561 A.2d at 182.
74. Id. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190.
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Because the statutes that Makovi identified as the basis of her claim
prescribed a set of civil remedies, the court concluded that there was
no reason for recognizing the tort.
77
E. Further Expansion of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge:
Watson II, Molesworth, and Wholey
Although Makovi evinced a clear intent to limit the scope of wrong-
ful discharge claims, the Court of Appeals has expanded the reach of
the tort in subsequent cases. First, in Watson v. Peoples Security Life In-
surance Co., 78 the court recognized a wrongful discharge claim by an
employee who was terminated for bringing an assault and battery
claim against a co-worker. 79 Next, in Molesworth v. Brandon,8" the
court recognized a cause of action based on a public policy mandate
expressed in an anti-discrimination statute against an employer that
was exempted from the statute's remedial scheme."1 Finally, in Wholey
v. Sears Roebuck,8 2 the court held that a wrongful discharge action may
exist when an employee is terminated for reporting criminal activity to
authorities."3
Watson I!arose from alleged sexual harassment of an employee by
a co-worker.8 4 The employee, Patricia Watson, brought a tort action
against both the co-worker and her employer."5 Shortly thereafter she
was terminated, and she amended her complaint to add a count of
wrongful discharge.8 6 She premised her wrongful discharge claim on
a violation of the public policy guaranteeing "her right to petition the
court," as expressed in the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, federal civil rights legislation, and the Maryland Declaration
of Rights. 8
7
The court addressed two principal issues: (1) whether an em-
ployee terminated for filing suit against her employer may state a
claim for wrongful discharge; and (2) whether an employee termi-
nated for filing suit against a co-worker for assault and battery may
77. Id.
78. 322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991).
79. Id. at 469, 588 A.2d at 760-61.
80. 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
81. Id. at 637, 672 A.2d at 616.
82. 370 Md. 38, 803 A.2d 482 (2002).
83. Id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484.
84. Watson II, 322 Md. at 472, 588 A.2d at 762.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 472, 588 A.2d at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2004] 613
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state a claim for wrongful discharge.88 On the first issue, the court
held that when an employer terminates an employee for filing suit
against the employer, there usually is no violation of public policy un-
less a statute expressly makes such termination unlawful.8 " Regarding
the second issue, the court found a cause of action to exist based
largely on a more general public policy emanating from the common
law: "the individual's interest in preserving bodily integrity and
personality." 0
In Molesworth, the court expanded the tort of wrongful discharge
insofar as it filled a void in at-will employment law. The court ad-
dressed a variation of the problem that arose in Makovi: whether a
wrongful discharge claim premised on a violation of public policy ex-
pressed in a statute may exist where the employee is not entitled to
relief under the statute's remedial scheme.91 Molesworth alleged that
she was terminated because of her sex.9 2 She premised her wrongful
discharge claim on a violation of section 14 of the Maryland Fair Em-
ployment Practices Act, which provided that it was State policy to en-
sure everyone in Maryland equal opportunity for employment
regardless of their race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, mari-
tal status, or physical or mental handicap.9" Molesworth's employer,
which was exempted from the remedial scheme of the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act because it had fewer than fifteen employees, con-
tended that it also was exempted from the public policy mandate
expressed in section 14." The court rejected this argument and held
that section 14 provided the requisite "clear mandate" of public policy
on which to base a wrongful discharge claim.95 The court did not
arrive at this conclusion by a cursory review of the statutory language;
rather, it performed an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history to
determine whether the legislature intended that all employers be cov-
88. Id. at 476-77, 588 A.2d at 764-65.
89. Id. at 480, 588 A.2d at 766.
90. Id. at 481, 588 A.2d at 767. Although the court emphasized that this public policy
was reinforced by federal legislation prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace, the
foundation for the claim lay in the common law of torts. Id. at 482, 588 A.2d at 768. It is
worth noting that the presence of a common law and statutory public policy basis for the
claim, rather than a purely statutory basis, was found to be essential in getting around the
Makovi rule. Id. at 484-86, 588 A.2d at 768-69.
91. 341 Md. 621, 628, 672 A.2d 608, 612 (1996).
92. Id. at 626, 672 A.2d at 611.
93. Id. at 628, 672 A.2d at 611-12. The Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act is
codified at Article 49B, sections 14-18 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, §§ 14-18 (1957).
94. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 628, 672 A.2d at 612.
95. Id. at 632, 672 A.2d at 613.
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ered by the policy mandate of section 14.96 The court also rejected
the employer's claim that the suit was barred by Makovi.9 7 Because
the statute left the public policy violation unremedied, the court rea-
soned that the core purpose for recognizing a wrongful discharge ac-
tion was still present.98
h/oley further expanded the tort of wrongful discharge by creat-
ing a new public policy exception. 99 In Wholey, the employee alleged
that he was terminated from his position as a security guard at Sears
because he reported what he suspected to be criminal acts by a store
manager to Sears management.1 00 The Court of Appeals held that a
cause of action could exist when an employee is terminated for report-
ing suspected criminal acts to law enforcement authorities, but that
Wholey failed to state a claim because he had only reported the acts to
company management. 10 1
Judge Raker concurred in the result, but sharply criticized the
court for reaching out to create a new public policy exception. 112
Judge Raker argued that the court's analysis was not consistent with
the limited public policy exception created by Adler L.1 " She went on
to note that the court "pays lip service to the notion that [it] should
proceed cautiously" in declaring public policy.' 4 Judge Raker also
argued that creating new public policy to support a wrongful dis-
charge claim is not the role of the courts and that courts should only
recognize an exception to the at-will employment rule where an ex-
isting, clear mandate of public policy necessitates such an
exception.1 0 5
F Wrongful Termination Claims Based on the Right to Counsel
Courts addressing the issue of whether a wrongful discharge claim
exists based on a violation of the employee's right to counsel have
96. Id. at 630-36, 672 A.2d at 613-16.
97. Id. at 636, 672 A.2d at 616.
98. Id. at 636-37, 672 A.2d at 616.
99. Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 43, 803 A.2d 482, 484 (2002).
100. Id. Importantly, the allegedly criminal acts that Wholey reported were acts by a
store manager, not criminal acts by the corporation, as were alleged in Adler I. Id.; Adler v.
Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 33, 432 A.2d 464, 466 (1981). This distinction, though
not noted by the Wholey court, may explain why WhoLey turned on the issue of whether the
public policy of the non-retaliation statute was violated, and not whether the acts by the
store manager were criminal.
101. Wholey, 370 Md. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484.
102. Id. at 71-76, 803 A.2d at 501-04 (Raker, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 72-73, 803 A.2d at 502.
104. Id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502.
105. Id. at 73, 803 A.2d at 502.
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reached different conclusions.' 0 6 Courts that have declined to find a
cause of action on these grounds have emphasized that the right to be
represented by counsel is a right that can be violated only by state
action and does not restrict the conduct of private parties.1 °7 This
being so, as the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois noted in Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,'°8 the em-
ployer does not violate the employee's right to counsel when it termi-
nates the employee in retaliation for securing legal counsel or
bringing suit, even if the termination penalizes the employee for his
actions.' °9 To bolster their arguments, these courts have pointed to
absurd consequences that might result if an employee can protect
himself from discharge by simply expressing a desire to consult with
an attorney: the employee obtains the job security that he cannot get
from his employment contract.1"'
In Thompto v. Coborn's Inc., 1 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa rejected Kavanagh's argument that to
recognize an action in such a case would turn the public policy excep-
tion into "the monster that swallowed the employment-at-will rule"
and recognized a wrongful discharge claim based on a violation of an
employee's right to counsel. 1 2 The Thompto court asserted that this
concern was baseless given the history of employment discharge litiga-
tion because it showed no "pattern of abuse" such as that predicted in
Kavanagh.'13 The Thompto court distinguished cases where the em-
ployee is terminated for consulting an attorney from cases where the
employee is terminated for actually bringing suit against the employer
and concluded that the latter case presented a narrow exception
106. Compare Simonelli v. Anderson Concrete Co., 650 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that an employee may state claim for wrongful discharge based on violation of
the right to counsel), and Thompto v. Coborn's Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Iowa 1994)
(same), with Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that employee
could not state a claim for wrongful discharge based on violation of right to counsel), and
Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same).
107. Kavanagh, 566 F. Supp. at 244; see Beam, 838 F.2d at 247 (noting that a constitu-
tional provision cited by the employee ensured access to courts rather than restricting the
employer's freedom to terminate the employee) (citing Kavanagh, 566 F. Supp. at 244).
108. 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
109. Id. at 244.
110. Id.; Beam, 838 F.2d at 247. The Court of Appeals signaled similar concerns in Wat-
son v. Peoples Security Life Insurance Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760, 765 (1991).
111. 871 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
112. Id. at 1118 n.12 (citation omitted). In Thompto, the terminated employee was in-
volved in a dispute with her employer over whether the employer had enrolled her in an
insurance plan. Id. at 1108. The employee alleged that she intended to seek legal counsel
if she did not receive an apology or explanation as to why her employer did not enroll her
in the insurance plan and that she was terminated shortly after stating this intent. Id.
113. Id. at 1118 n.12.
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where a violation of public policy could be found." 4 The court ex-
amined the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility, cases guarantee-
ing the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, and statutory
provisions awarding attorney's fees to discern a public policy that fa-
vors communication with an attorney so that an individual will be
aware of the legal implications of his circumstances. 1 ' However, the
court never confronted Kavanagh's assertion that the right to counsel
cannot be violated by a private party.' 1 6
G. Maryland's Rejection of Rights Against the State as
Clear Mandates of Public Policy
Employees in Maryland who have attempted to use constitutional
rights against the state as a basis for wrongful discharge claims have
been unsuccessful. 1 7 In Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Services of Balti-
more" and Miller v. Fairchild Industries,'19 the Court of Special Appeals
declined to recognize a wrongful discharge cause of action against pri-
vate employers where employees claimed to have been discharged for
exercising their free speech rights. 2 ° As the court reasoned, these
rights cannot be violated without state action, and thus cannot serve as
the basis for wrongful discharge claims against a private employer.' 2'
114. Id. at 1119.
115. Id. at 1119-21.
116. Id. at 1116-21.
117. Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs., Inc., 98 Md. App. 123, 134-35, 623 A.2d 463,
468-69 (1993) (holding that an employee who claimed to have been fired in retaliation for
exercising her free speech rights failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge); Miller v.
Fairchild Indus., 97 Md. App. 324, 336-37, 629 A.2d 1293, 1299 (1993) (same).
118. 98 Md. App. 123, 632 A.2d 463 (1993).
119. 97 Md. App. 324, 629 A.2d 1293 (1993).
120. Bleich, 98 Md. App. at 134-35, 632 A.2d at 468-69; Miller, 97 Md. App. at 336-37, 629
A.2d at 1299.
121. Bleich, 98 Md. App. at 134-35, 632 A.2d at 468-69; Miller, 97 Md. App. at 336-37, 629
A.2d at 1299. In Miller, the plaintiff pointed to Kessler v. Equity Management, 82 Md. App.
577, 588, 572 A.2d 1144, 1150 (1990), where the court found a clear mandate of public
policy based in the law of trespass and the constitutional right to privacy. Miller, 97 Md.
App. at 337, 629 A.2d at 1299. In Kessler, the employee, a resident manager at an apart-
ment complex, was terminated after refusing her employer's request to enter and search
tenants' apartments when the tenants were not home. 82 Md. App. 577, 582-83, 572 A.2d
1144, 1147. The court found that the employee had stated a claim for wrongful discharge
because the employer's decision to terminate her when she refused to commit a trespass
and violate the tenants' constitutional right of privacy amounted to a violation of a clear
mandate of public policy. Id. at 590, 572 A.2d at 1151. The Miller court rejected the argu-
ment that Kessler supported a claim for wrongful discharge based on a violation of the
employee's constitutional rights. 97 Md. App. at 337, 629 A.2d at 1299. It noted the "vast
difference" between firing an employee for refusing to commit a tortious act against a
third party where constitutional rights are implicated, and firing an employee for exercis-
ing her right of free speech in a way that harms her employer. Id. The court noted that
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In Miller, the court acknowledged that terminating an employee for
exercising his free speech rights would chill free speech, but flatly re-
jected that such chilling effect constituted a violation of public
policy.122
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., the court held that an employee
terminated for stating a desire to consult with an attorney regarding
an employment dispute does not state a claim for wrongful discharge
under Maryland law. 123 Judge Harrell, joined by Judges Wilner,
Cathell, and Battaglia, delivered the opinion of the court. 1 24 The
court did not find a clear mandate of public policy to support a
wrongful discharge claim premised on a violation of the general right
to consult with an attorney.
1 2 5
After examining the parties' arguments and the lower court's
opinion in detail, the court proceeded to discuss Adler I, taking note
of its warnings on judicial discernment of public policy. 126 It went on
to discuss the important limitation put in place by Makovi and noted
Molesworth and Watson has examples of cases where it had discerned a
clear mandate of public policy.'
27
The court characterized the public policy underlying
Porterfield's claim in broad terms as the "general right of access to
legal counsel."'128 It stated that Porterfield was incorrect to assume
simply because Kessler involved potential violations of the constitutional ights of third par-
ties did not mean that it can be read as supporting a cause of action for employees who
allege that their own constitutional rights are violated. Id.
122. 97 Md. App. at 336, 629 A.2d at 1299. Similarly, in Watson II, the Court of Appeals
held that an employee terminated in retaliation for bringing suit against a private em-
ployer and a co-worker could not premise a wrongful discharge claim on alleged violations
of her constitutional rights of free speech and due process. 322 Md. 467, 428-29, 588 A.2d
at 764.
123. 374 Md. 402, 429-30, 823 A.2d 590, 606-07 (2003).
124. Id. at 407, 823 A.2d at 593.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 424, 823 A.2d at 603.
127. Id. at 426-28, 823 A.2d at 604-05.
128. Id. at 429, 823 A.2d at 606. Porterfield drew on numerous sources of law for her
asserted mandate of public policy. First, she cited Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights, which guarantee access to counsel in criminal and civil cases. Id. at 416,
823 A.2d at 598. Second, Porterfield relied on case law holding that the right to counsel is
an important public policy in Maryland. See id. (citing Zetty v. Piatt, 365 Md. 141, 776 A.2d
631 (2001), and Rutheiford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 464 A.2d 228 (1983)). Third,
Porterfield asserted that the attorney-client privilege, because it is premised on the impor-
tant role of an attorney as an advisor to a client, supported a general right to counsel. Id.
at 416, 823 A.2d at 598. Fourth, Porterfield cited the Maryland Legal Services Corporation
Act, which is intended to advance the goal of ensuring that all persons have access to
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that this general right would furnish protection in her case. 129 The
court adopted the employer's argument that if the employee were
protected by the general right to counsel in such cases, she "could be
immunized from an adverse employment action by simply announc-
ing, 'I am calling a lawyer.' "130
Although the court signaled its practical concerns over this type
of immunization, it rejected Porterfield's argument on doctrinal
grounds.13 1 The court concluded that Maryland does not recognize
the general right to consult with an attorney as a clear mandate of
public policy, such that it can support a wrongful discharge action.13 2
In support of this conclusion, the court examined the numerous con-
stitutional and statutory sources guaranteeing the right to counsel that
Porterfield cited as the basis for her asserted public policy mandate
and rejected each one for not being on point.' 33
Pointing to Wholey and Molesworth, the court noted that the public
policy basis for Porterfield's claim was weak comparatively and that
the former two cases involved the narrow application of a wrongful
discharge cause of action to situations that were not covered explicitly
in the statutes from which the relevant public policy was discerned.13 1
The court noted that in Wholey it allowed a wrongful discharge claim
by a private employee to vindicate public policy found in a
whistleblower statute that applied exclusively to public employees.1 3 5
Molesworth, the court reasoned, was also a narrow exception, as it in-
volved the application of a statutory mandate of public policy to an
employer that was outside the coverage of the statute's remedial
scheme. 13
6
The court found further support for its rejection of Porterfield's
claim in Watson H and Ewing. 37 The court reasoned that to recognize
a cause of action where an employee is terminated for stating a desire
to consult with an attorney but not where the employee is terminated
counsel in civil proceedings. Id. at 417, 823 A.2d at 599. Finally, an amicus brief filed in
support of Porterfield's case cited to other statutory bases, and in particular, the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct as sources of law supporting a public policy exception in
Porterfield's case. Id. at 414 n.12, 823 A.2d at 597 n.12.




133. Id. at 432-34, 823 A.2d at 608-09.
134. Id. at 431-32, 823 A.2d at 607.
135. Id. at 431, 823 A.2d at 607.
136. Id. at 431-32, 823 A.2d at 607.
137. Id. at 430, 823 A.2d at 607.
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for bringing suit against the employer would be "incongruous.""13
The court relied on Ewing for the proposition that the tort of wrong-
ful discharge is only available in cases of "particularly reprehensible
conduct."139 Without discussing particulars, the court concluded that
there was no such conduct in this case.
140
Judge Eldridge, joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Raker, dis-
sented. 1 ' Judge Eldridge criticized the majority for its narrow read-
ing of the tort of wrongful discharge, and for failing to recognize the
right to counsel as sufficient to support a wrongful discharge claim.
142
He predicted that under the majority's reasoning, an employer might
lawfully use the threat of termination to coerce an employee to sign




In Porterfield II, the court held that a general right to counsel is
not a clear mandate of public policy sufficient to support a wrongful
discharge claim. 144 In declining to recognize Porterfield's cause of
action, the court adhered to Adler l's narrow construction of the pub-
lic policy exception. 145 However, by failing to put in place a clear stan-
dard on how to resolve wrongful discharge claims, the court missed an
opportunity to restore doctrinal stability to this area of law. 1 46 Equally
concerning is the court's mischaracterization of key precedent, which
threatens to further confuse litigants bringing or defending wrongful
discharge claims. 147 Finally, by failing to make a clear statement on
which types of public policies are vindicated appropriately by the tort
of wrongful discharge, the court left the door open to spurious
claims.1 4 8
138. Id.
139. Id. at 431, 823 A.2d at 607.
140. Id. at 434, 823 A.2d at 609.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 435, 823 A.2d at 609 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 436, 823 A.2d at 610.
144. Id. at 429, 823 A.2d at 606.
145. See infta notes 150-162 and accompanying text (discussing how Porterfield H adheres
to Adler I's approach rather than Woley's).
146. See infra notes 163-191 and accompanying text (discussing Porterfield II's failure to
clarify the standard for discerning where there is a violation of a clear mandate of public
policy).
147. See infta notes 192-205 and accompanying text (discussing the court's mischaracter-
ization of Wholey).
148. See infra notes.206-222 and accompanying text (discussing the court's failure to
state that Porterfield's claim failed because her employer, as a private actor, could not have
violated her rights).
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A. Back Towards Adler I: The Court Returns to a Narrow Reading
of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge
In the wake of Wholey, it seemed more likely that a discharged
employee could state a claim for wrongful discharge with only a tenu-
ous basis in public policy.14 9 In Wholey, the court was not nearly as
exacting in its approach to the public policy question as it had been in
previous cases. 5 ' The court cobbled together a public policy man-
date with different statutes, none of which spoke directly to the facts
of Wholey's termination. 15 1 Moreover, the court reasoned that this
mandate would be violated when an employee is terminated for re-
porting suspected criminal activities to appropriate authorities, even
though such a termination would not constitute an actual violation of
the statutes on which this policy mandate is based. 152
Following Wholey, one might have expected the court to recog-
nize Porterfield's claim. As the court recognized a cause of action in
Wholey despite the absence of an actual violation of the law underlying
the wrongful discharge claim, the fact that Porterfield could show no
such violation would not have seemed to impede her claim. 153 Moreo-
ver, although the court characterized Porterfield's asserted public pol-
icy mandate as a general right to counsel, Porterfield did tether this
mandate to statutes, as Wholey had done.15 4 Arguably, Porterfield
presented an even stronger public policy mandate than did Wholey:
while Porterfield pointed to constitutional guarantees and cases rec-
ognizing the right to counsel as an important public policy, Wholey
pointed only to a whistleblower protection statute and a statute
criminalizing violent retaliation against witnesses.
155
149. See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 73, 803 A.2d 482, 502-03 (2002) (Raker,
J., concurring) (accusing the plurality of "creating public policy to justify an exception to
the at-will employment doctrine").
150. See id. at 71-76, 803 A.2d at 501-04 (criticizing the plurality for disregarding Adler I
and noting that the plurality opinion in Wholey is inconsistent with precedent).
151. In WhoLey, the court relied on two statutes. The first protects public employee
whistleblowers. Id. at 57-58, 803 A.2d at 493-94. The second makes it a criminal act to
harm a person or his property in retaliation for that person's reporting crimes to authori-
ties or acting as a witness in official proceedings. Id. at 57-59, 803 A.2d at 493-94. Neither
of these statutes was applicable. The employer was a private employer, and the suspected
criminal activities were reported to company management, not law enforcement. Id. at 43-
44, 803 A.2d at 484-85.
152. Id. at 59, 803 A.2d at 494.
153. Id.; Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc. 374 Md. 402, 432-34, 823 A.2d 590, 608-09 (2003).
154. Wholey, 370 Md. at 56-59; 803 A.2d at 492-94; Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 415-17, 823
A.2d at 598-99.




However, in Porterfield II, the court did not embark on the 'judi-
cial foray[ ] into the wilderness of discerning 'public policy' , 15 6 that it
had in Woley. Instead, the Porterfield II court adhered to its decision
in Adler I. Inasmuch as Porterfield II rejected a generalized public pol-
icy basis for a wrongful discharge claim in much the same way that
Adler I did, the two cases are consistent on a basic level.1" 7 Similar to
Adler's asserted mandate of a general public policy against commer-
cial bribery and falsification of corporate documents was Porterfield's
claim of a public policy favoring access to legal counsel. 158 Neither
claim was supported by the employee's identification of any actual vio-
lation of a statute, constitutional provision, administrative regulation,
or common law rule in which the asserted public policy was ex-
pressed.1 59 As such, in neither case could the court find any violation
of a clear mandate of public policy. 6' Moreover, if Adler I is read to
have recognized only causes of action where the employee is termi-
nated for refusing to commit an illegal act or for performing a statuto-
rily prescribed duty, then Porterfield's termination is beyond the
scope of cognizable actions under AdlerL16l Thus, in its result at least,
Porterfield II seems to mark a return to the narrow public policy excep-
tion of Adler I.
B. Failure to Put in Place a Clear and Manageable Standard
In Porterfield II, the Court of Appeals was presented with the op-
portunity to correct the mistakes that were made in WoLy.' 62 Al-
though principles of judicial restraint counseled against disturbing
156. Wholey, 370 Md. at 76; 803 A.2d at 504 (Raker, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
157. Compare Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 429-30, 823 A.2d at 606 (rejecting a general right to
consult with counsel as the public policy basis for a wrongful discharge claim), with Adler v.
Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 43-45, 432 A.2d 464, 471-72 (1981) (rejecting generalized
public policy against commercial bribery and falsification of corporate documents as a suf-
ficient basis for a wrongful discharge claim).
158. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 429, 823 A.2d at 606; Adler I, 291 Md. at 43-44, 432 A.2d at
471.
159. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 429-30, 823 A.2d at 606; Adler I, 291 Md. at 44, 432 A.2d at
471.
160. Porterfield I, 374 Md. at 429-30, 823 A.2d at 606; Adler I, 291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at
473.
161. See Adler I, 291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470 (noting that the circumstances in which
an employee can bring a wrongful discharge action should be limited to cases where she is
terminated for refusing to engage in illegal conduct or for performing a statutorily pre-
scribed duty).
162. See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 71-76, 803 A.2d 482, 501-04 (2002)
(Raker, J., concurring) (criticizing plurality for disregarding warnings of Adler 1).
622 [VOL. 63:605
PORTERFIELD V. MASCARI IIH, INC.
the holding in Wholey, 163 in Porterfield H the court missed a chance to
put in place a clear and manageable standard to govern the adjudica-
tion of wrongful discharge claims."' The probable result is that liti-
gants will remain confused as to the validity of wrongful discharge
claims, and judges will continue to have difficulty adjudicating these
claims.165
The primary problem with the court's reasoning is its failure to
state precisely when a clear mandate of public policy is violated. 166
This question is independent of whether such a mandate exists. 167
Simply put, the court should have made plain that there cannot be a
violation of public policy sufficient to support a wrongful discharge
claim where there is no actual or threatened violation of statutes, con-
stitutional provisions, common law rules, or administrative regulations
in which the public policy mandate is expressed. 168 An actual or
threatened violation of the laws in which the public policy mandate is
expressed has been a common thread in cases where Maryland courts
have recognized wrongful discharge claims, Wholey being an excep-
tion. 169 Moreover, the absence of any actual violation of law was dis-
163. See Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 494, 830 A.2d 450, 469-70 (2003) (discussing
the principle of stare decisis and noting that it is desirable to leave settled law undis-
turbed). Because of factual dissimilarities between the two cases, the Porterfield Hcourt did
not need to overturn Wholey to reach the result that it did.
164. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (noting
that a narrowly defined public policy exception helps the court "weed out" cases that do
not have a sufficient public policy basis); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 513
(N.J. 1980) (noting that a clearly enunciated standard for wrongful discharge claims will
allow courts to screen cases that should be dismissed before trial).
165. See infra notes 167-221 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion among
courts and litigants that may exist in the wake of Porterfield I).
166. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 421-34, 823 A.2d at 601-09.
167. See id. at 429-30, 823 A.2d at 606 (noting that even if the court recognized a clear
mandate of public policy, Porterfield had not alleged sufficiently that such a mandate was
violated).
168. See, e.g., Clark v. Modern Group, Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that
there must be an actual violation of a law for a clear violation of public policy to be
present).
169. See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 70, 803 A.2d 482, 501 (2002) (finding
wrongful discharge claim despite no actual violation of a statute prohibiting violent retalia-
tion against witnesses); Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 637, 672 A.2d 608, 616
(1996) (recognizing wrongful discharge claim where an employer was found to have vio-
lated the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act although the employer was exempted
from the statute's remedial scheme); Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467,
483, 588 A.2d 760, 767 (1991) (recognizing wrongful discharge claim premised on the
commission of the torts of assault and battery and violations of Title VII and the Maryland
Fair Employment Practices Act); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 50, 537 A.2d 1173,
1175 (1988) (recognizing wrongful discharge claim based on the employer's discharge of
an employee in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim where discharge under
such circumstances was made a crime by statute). Additionally, Court of Special Appeals'
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positive in Adler L170 Had Adler been able to prove criminal acts by
his employer, it is almost certain that the court would have concluded
that he could state a claim for wrongful discharge.' 7 '
Although the courts of Maryland have failed to state explicitly
that there must be an actual violation of some rule of law to support a
wrongful discharge claim,' 72 this proposition is implicit in the ap-
proach that the courts have taken in disposing of wrongful discharge
claims. For example, in Miller, the court flatly rejected a claim pre-
mised on a violation of the "spirit and intent" of constitutional free
speech guarantees.' 73 Additionally, in cases where an employee has
set forth a statute as a basis for a public policy mandate supporting a
wrongful discharge claim, courts have engaged in a very narrow in-
quiry into whether that statute was violated and have concluded that if
the statute was not violated, a wrongful discharge claim could not
exist.174
By failing on this front, the court not only left the law unclear,
but it also did little to discourage the meritless claims that inevitably
arise from employment relationships that have soured.1 7 5 Making a
cases further support this point. See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., 82 Md. App. 577, 588, 572
A.2d 1144, 1150 (1990) (finding a cause of action where the employee refused to the
commit tort of trespass); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs., Inc., 98 Md. App. 123, 135,
623 A.2d 463, 469 (1993) (finding no cause of action for wrongful discharge premised on
violating free speech rights where the court found no actual violation of such rights);
Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 97 Md. App. 324, 336, 629 A.2d 1293, 1300 (1989) (same).
170. SeeAdler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 44, 432 A.2d 464, 471 (1981) (finding
no violation of public policy because Adler did not allege sufficiently that his employer's
conduct that he characterized as commercial bribery and falsification of corporate docu-
ments was criminal conduct).
171. See id, (emphasizing that Adler had not shown an actual violation of the statute on
which his public policy mandate was based, and thus he had not shown the requisite viola-
tion of public policy).
172. The Court of Special Appeals perhaps came closest in McIntyre v. Guild, Inc., where
it noted that an employee must allege clear, specific allegations of fact that tend to show
that the employer either violated the law at issue or punished the employee for exercising
a legal right. 105 Md. App. 332, 344, 659 A.2d 398, 404 (1995). The court included cases
where an employee is fired for refusing to commit an illegal act. Id.
173. Miller, 97 Md. App. at 336-37, 629 A.2d at 1299 (emphasis omitted).
174. See Ball v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 325 Md. 652, 653, 602 A.2d 1176, 1176 (1992)
(limiting the inquiry to whether the employer violated a criminal statute prohibiting a
party from "coercing or intimidating" a person to contribute to a social, economic, or
political organization); McIntyre, 105 Md. App. at 344, 659 A.2d at 403 (determining that
because the employee did not allege sufficiently that the employer violated the Federal
False Claims Act, there was no violation of public policy premised on that statute).
175. Vexatious lawsuits are of particular concern in the context of wrongful discharge.
As Professor Blades, an early advocate of the recognition of this tort notes, the possibility
that juries will side with the employee and the fact that wrongful discharge claims often
present credibility contests between the employer and employee are such that disgruntled
employees may be willing to file meritless claims. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At-will vs.
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more assured statement on when a clear mandate of public policy is
violated would discourage employees from filing spurious claims
based on generalized notions of what type of behavior by employers
runs against the public interest.'7 6 As a result, such a statement might
decrease the volume of cases where an employee can point to no
other basis for his claim apart from simply feeling wronged by his em-
ployer's actions. Furthermore, such a clarification would work to-
wards the goal of efficient disposal of wrongful discharge claims. ' 77 If
plaintiffs in wrongful discharge actions are on notice that they must
demonstrate that some rule of law actually has been violated, they may
be discouraged from including a survey of multiple arguments in their
pleadings. Instead, they may focus on specific rules of law that have
been violated. This survey approach is typified in Adler II and
Porterfield II, where the plaintiffs identified numerous sources of law
that were inapplicable to the facts of their cases, but from which they
nevertheless sought to invite the court to select a clear mandate of
public policy.1 78 Not only is this approach undesirable because the
court actually might accept the invitation, as it did in Woley, 179 but
also because it results in an inefficient use ofjudicial resources.
The court also left the law unclear by failing to lay out the specific
circumstances where recognizing a wrongful discharge claim is appro-
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Discharge Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 1404, 1428 (1967).
176. See Adler I, 291 Md. at 42-43, 432 A.2d at 470-71 (warning against recognizing a
wrongful discharge claim whenever the employer's acts appear "wrongful," and rejecting
Adler's definition of public policy as that which is "commonly accepted as necessary to the
public good"); see also Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Wash. 1989) (noting the
need to reject claims where the employee's actions merely are commendable by general
societal standards or when such actions may result in some minor benefit for the public at
large).
177. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (noting
that a narrowly defined public policy exception helps the court "weed out" cases that do
not have a sufficient public policy basis); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 513
(N.J. 1980) (noting that a clearly enunciated standard for wrongful discharge claims will
allow courts to screen cases that should be dismissed before trial).
178. See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1305 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that
Adler identified seventeen federal and state statutes to support his claim, none of which
the court found were violated); Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 415-17, 823
A.2d 590, 598-99 (2003) (discussing the numerous sources of law identified by Porterfield).
Porterfield took a particularly broad approach, identifying rules of law pertaining to crimi-
nal trials, the attorney-client privilege, and the availability of counsel for indigents. Id. at
415-17, 823 A.2d at 598-99.
179. See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 71-74, 803 A.2d 482, 501-03 (2002)




priate.18 0 Instead, the court relied on the more amorphous concept
of a clear mandate of public policy, a concept that courts have had
difficulty applying."' The articulation of the specific circumstances
under which wrongful discharge claims are cognizable would not only
make the law clearer to litigants and possibly discourage meritless
claims that fall outside of the articulated categories, but it would also,
as Judge Raker noted, "limit[ ] judicial forays into the wilderness of
discerning 'public policy."" 82 As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit noted in Adler v. American Standard Corp., limiting wrongful dis-
charge claims to the circumstances expressly articulated by the Court
of Appeals in Adler I, "ties abusive discharge claims down to a manage-
able and clear standard."' With these issues in mind, the court
should have discerned from the cases the following categories and
clearly articulated them as circumstances in which wrongful discharge
claims are cognizable: (1) cases where an employee is terminated for
refusing to engage in unlawful conduct; 4 (2) cases where an em-
ployee is terminated for fulfilling a legal obligation;' 85 and (3) cases
where an employee is terminated for exercising a specific legal
right.18
6
180. See id. at 71-76, 803 A.2d at 501-04 (Raker, J., concurring) (noting that Maryland
courts have recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge only where the employee
is fired for refusing to commit an unlawful act or for exercising a specific legal right or
duty).
181. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 421-34, 823 A.2d at 601-09; see also WhoLey, 370 Md. at 74-76,
803 A.2d at 503-04 (Raker, J., concurring) (noting "dangers inherent in judicial involve-
ment in the formation of public policy" and that "jurists to this day have been unable to
fashion a truly workable definition of public policy"); Adler I, 291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at
470-71 (anticipating the difficulty that courts would have in determining when a policy
mandate is sufficiently clear).
182. Wholey, 370 Md. at 75-76, 803 A.2d at 504 (Raker, J., concurring).
183. 830 F.2d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Adler III].
184. See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., 82 Md. App. 577, 588, 572 A.2d 1144, 1150 (1990)
(recognizing wrongful discharge claim where employee refused to commit tort of tres-
pass); Adler I, 291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470 (holding that wrongful termination claim
should be recognized where employee is discharged for refusing to commit an illegal act).
185. See Adler 1, 291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470 (holding that wrongful termination claim
should be recognized where employee is discharged for performance of a statutorily pre-
scribed duty). The typical example of this situation is where an employee is terminated for
fulfilling his obligation to serve on a jury. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603,
610, 561 A.2d 179, 182 (1989).
186. SeeWatson v. Peoples Sec. Life Inc. Co., 322 Md. 467, 481, 588 A.2d 760, 766 (1991)
(recognizing a wrongful discharge claim based on employee's termination in retaliation
for the exercise of her right to bring a tort action against her co-worker); Ewing v. Koppers
Co., 312 Md. 45, 50, 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1988) (recognizing a wrongful discharge claim
where employee was terminated for exercising his right to file for benefits under worker's
compensation law).
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These basic categories would provide a touchstone of doctrinal
stability for litigants and judges handling wrongful discharge
claims.187 By determining whether a case falls within one of these cat-
egories, a litigant could better determine the strength of his case. If
an employee's case fell outside of these categories, he might decide
not to bring suit at all. Furthermore, if these categories were articu-
lated clearly, an employer would be better equipped to make in-
formed decisions on discharging employees.188 This might be
especially true of employers operating small businesses, who may lack
the resources to vet such decisions with legal counsel.' 89 Equally sig-
nificant, if a case fell outside these categories, a judge would know to
proceed with caution. 9 ' However, as these categories provide more
of an analytical framework than black letter law, a judge still could
find the requisite public policy basis so long as the employee pointed
to a violation of some rule of law.
C. Mischaracterization of Wholey
In Porterfield II, the court mischaracterized its reasoning in Wholey
in a manner that threatens to undermine the precedential value of
both cases and confuse lawyers and judges involved in wrongful dis-
charge cases. In support of its finding that Porterfield had not as-
serted a clear mandate of public policy, the court sought to
distinguish WhoLey. '9 As the court reasoned, Porterfield's asserted
mandate of public policy was far weaker than the one at issue in
Wholey.' 2 Presumably, this conclusion was based on the court's find-
ing that the sources of public policy on which Porterfield relied did
not speak directly to the circumstances of her termination, while
those on which Wholey relied were squarely on point.19 3 More signifi-
cantly, the court noted that WhoLey, like Molesworth, involved the nar-
187. Adler III, 830 F.2d at 1307 (noting that restricting the tort to discrete categories
results in a clear and workable standard).
188. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (noting
that a narrowly defined public policy exception enables employers to make termination
decisions without fear of being held liable for wrongful discharge).
189. See Glenn M. Gomes & James F. Morgan, Meeting the Wrongful Discharge Challenge:
Legislative Options for Small Business, 30J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., Oct. 1992, at 98 (noting that
small businesses are least capable of meeting the legal and operational costs associated
with wrongful discharge cases).
190. See Adler 1, 291 Md. at 45-46, 432 A.2d at 472 (noting that the discernment of previ-
ously undeclared public policy must be done with great caution).
191. Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 431, 823 A.2d 590, 607 (2003).
192. Id.




row application of a wrongful discharge cause of action to
circumstances that were beyond the reach of the statute from which
the relevant public policy was discerned." 4
Whoey, however, was not a such a narrow extension.1 9 5 The
Wholey court did not extend the policy mandate of a statute protecting
public employee whistleblowers to private employees, as the Porterfield
H court claimed.' 9 6 The Wholey court mentioned the public employee
whistleblower statute only to show that it did not afford Wholey a rem-
edy and that his claim was not barred by Makovi.'9 7 The public em-
ployee whistleblower statute played no significant role in the court's
discernment of a public policy.19 As the court acknowledged, the
whistleblower statute applied only to public employees; its purpose
was to protect the public from malfeasance by public officials.199 Be-
cause this interest was not implicated in Wholey's case, there was no
nexus between the public policy that the statute was meant to advance
and the recognition of a wrongful discharge claim in this context.
200
Instead, as the Wholey court expressly noted, it found a statute
criminalizing violent retaliation against witnesses to be most signifi-
cant in its finding of a public policy mandate. 21  This mandate, as
Judge Raker pointed out in her concurrence, is highly questionable,
as there was no actual violation of the statute at issue.20 2
With this gloss on Wholey peeled away, the dissimilarities between
Wholey and Porterfield H become less clear, and the court's reasoning
becomes more suspect. If Wholey was not the narrow expansion of the
194. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 431-32, 823 A.2d at 607.
195. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 72-73, 803 A.2d at 502-03 (Raker, J., concurring) (criticizing
the plurality for reaching out to create a new exception to the at-will rule by the use of
"expansive public policy dicta").
196. Compare Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 431-32, 823 A.2d at 607, with Wholey, 370 Md. at 57-
58, 803 A.2d at 493. Such an extension would have been unjustified, as the purpose of the
public employee whistleblower statute is to protect against malfeasance by government ac-
tors. Wholey, 370 Md. at 57 n.l1, 823 A.2d at 493 n.l. This interest is not implicated in a
private employment setting.
197. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 57, 823 A.2d at 492 (finding no bar to the action under




200. Id. at 57, 803 A.2d at 492 (noting that the legislature has declined to extend
whistleblower protection to private employees).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, J., concurring) (noting that the anti-retaliation
statute relied upon by the plurality does not apply to persons who are not victims or wit-
nesses reporting crimes to authorities or testifying in official proceedings).
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public policy exception that Porterfield II claimed that it was, 2 01 it is
more difficult to distinguish Wholey from Porterfield IL Why the court
mischaracterized its reasoning in Wholey is not clear. Although it may
be pure oversight, the treatment of the Whoey court's reasonings may
be an attempt to deal with the problematic implications of Wholey by
cabining it into a category of cases like Molesworth, where the court
found a clear public policy expressed in a statute and applied it to a
set of circumstances just beyond the coverage of the statute.2"4 If this
is a recognition of the mistakes made in WoLey, the court should have
remedied these mistakes in a more transparent manner. On a more
practical level, this mischaracterization threatens to leave litigants and
judges confused as to the meanings of both Wholey and Porterfield I.
D. Failure to Clarify What Public Policies Are Vindicated Appropriately
by Wrongful Discharge Claims
Porterfield H provided a vehicle for the court to clarify exactly what
types of public policies may be vindicated by the tort of wrongful dis-
charge. The court should have made plain that rights that can be
violated only by state action are an inadequate basis for the public
policy mandate that is needed to support a claim for wrongful dis-
charge.2 °5 Because the court failed to make such a statement, the per-
suasive force of its opinion is weakened. Moreover, the court left the
door open to claims premised on public policies that cannot be vio-
lated by private employers and are not capable of being vindicated by
wrongful discharge actions.20 6
Central to the court's failure on this front is that it does not rec-
ognize that the general right to counsel does not create any limita-
tions on the conduct of private parties.2 0 7 The sources of law that
Porterfield pointed to as grounds for the general right to counsel en-
sure that an individual has the opportunity to consult with or be rep-
resented by counsel before her rights are adjudicated by the state.21 8 As
such, these rights cannot be violated where a private employer termi-
203. See Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 431-32, 823 A.2d 590, 607 (2003)
(characterizing Who/ey and Molesworth as narrow expansions of the public policy
exception).
204. See id. (analogizing Who/y and Molesworth).
205. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 97 Md. App. 324, 339, 629 A.2d 1293, 1300 (1993)
(holding that there is no violation of public policy where the employee premises a wrong-
ful discharge claim on the violation of his right to free speech, because that right cannot
be violated by a private actor).
206. Id.
207. Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242, 244 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
208. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 432-33, 823 A.2d at 608.
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nates an employee, and there is no public policy violation in
Porterfield's case.2" 9 Where there is no violation of public policy, the
tort of wrongful discharge cannot exist.210 Given the lack of clarity
inherent when a court attempts to determine whether public policy
has been violated, a finding that the employer had not violated public
policy for the simple reason that it is incapable of committing such a
violation would have been desirable in this case.21
This formulation would have provided a powerful alternative ba-
sis for rejecting Porterfield's claim. While the court hardly can be crit-
icized for articulating all alternative grounds for disposing of this case,
this ground is particularly persuasive. Unlike the analysis of the pub-
lic policy mandate that the court performed, this analysis does not
require the court to engage in a process that ultimately may devolve
into an ad hoc value judgment about the relative importance and
strength of the policies at issue.212 Rather, this ground relies only on
the well-settled limitations of the rights asserted.213
Before Porterfield II, the Court of Special Appeals adopted this line
of reasoning in Bleich and Miller, where employees premised wrongful
discharge claims on the violation of their constitutional rights of free
speech.214  Although Porterfield II acknowledged the reasoning of
Miller and Bleich, it declined expressly to adopt it.215 Miller made clear
the logical disconnect that such claims failed to account for when it
noted that " [t] he employee has a constitutional right to speak but not
a constitutional right to remain an employee." 21 6 The Miller court rec-
209. Id. Porterfield argued that because the sources of public policy on which she relied
were not derived from constitutional sources, they bind both public and private actors.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 17, Porterfield II (No. 14). This argument ignores the nature of
the rights secured by those sources of public policy; the general right to counsel flows from
constitutional sources. See Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 358-59, 464 A.2d 228,
234 (1983) (citing constitutional sources as the basis for the right to counsel in a civil
contempt proceeding).
210. See Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 422, 823 A.2d at 602 (noting that a wrongful discharge
action may exist where there is a violation of a clear mandate of public policy).
211. See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 71-76, 803 A.2d 482, 501-04 (2002)
(Raker, J., concurring) (noting the problematic nature of judicial discernment of public
policy).
212. See id. (noting that principles of public policy change with public opinion, and that
judges are required to discern these principles based only on their experience and intellec-
tual capacity).
213. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 97 Md. App. 324, 336, 629 A.2d 1293, 1300 (1993)
(noting that constitutional rights are "uniformly interpreted" as restricting only the con-
duct of the state).
214. Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs., Inc., 98 Md. App. 123, 131, 623 A.2d 463, 407
(1993); Miller, 97 Md. App. at 336, 629 A.2d at 1300.
215. Porterfield II, 374 Md. at 420, 428-34, 823 A.2d at 600, 607-09.
216. Miller, 97 Md. App. at 337, 629 A.2d at 1300.
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ognized the chilling effect that such discharges might have, but it was
unwilling to find that this chilling effect violated public policy.217 It is
likely that discharges such as Porterfield's would discourage employ-
ees from seeking counsel in much the same way. As Miller held, how-
ever, such a result would not be sufficient grounds for finding a
violation of public policy.2 18
Finally, adopting this line of reasoning would have had the effect
of discouraging similar meritless claims. As Miller and Bleich demon-
strate, this line of reasoning forecloses similar wrongful discharge
claims premised on alleged violations of rights against the state.2 1 9
One can imagine claims being based on an employer's alleged viola-
tion of a number of rights that secure individual liberties against the
state, including the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
self-incrimination, and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.22' The reasoning of Miller and Bleich arguably would bar
such suits. 22' Had the court adopted this reasoning, it would have
done much to ensure that the public policy exception remains a nar-
row one.
V. CONCLUSION
In Porterfield II, the Court of Appeals moved the tort of wrongful
discharge closer to the narrowly defined cause of action that was ar-
ticulated when the tort was first recognized in Maryland. 22 However,
the court did not articulate clearly a rule to govern the determination
of whether public policy has been violated.223 It also failed to lay out
the specific circumstances in which wrongful discharge claims are cog-
217. Id. at 336-37, 629 A.2d at 1300.
218. Id.
219. Bleich, 98 Md. App. at 134, 623 A.2d at 468 (rejecting a wrongful discharge claim
premised on the alleged violation of constitutional rights, brought against a private em-
ployer, because the employer was not a state actor); Miller, 97 Md. App. at 337-38, 629 A.2d
at 1300 (same).
220. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 626 (3d Cir. 1992) (re-
jecting wrongful discharge claim under Pennsylvania law where the employee was termi-
nated for refusing to submit to a drug test and premised the claim on her constitutional
right to privacy).
221. Bleich, 98 Md. App. at 134, 623 A.2d at 468 (rejecting a wrongful discharge claim
premised on the alleged violation of constitutional rights, brought against a private em-
ployer, because the employer was not a state actor); Miller, 97 Md. App. at 337-38, 629 A.2d
at 1300 (same).
222. See supra notes 150-162 and accompanying text (arguing that the decision in
Porterfield II is consonant with the narrow public policy exception of Adler 1).
223. See supra notes 163-180 and accompanying text (arguing that the court could have
made the law of wrongful discharge clearer by holding that a clear mandate of public
policy is not violated unless there is some actual or threatened violation of law).
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nizable in such a way as to clarify the inherently difficult search for a
"clear mandate of public policy. ' 224 Also troubling were the court's
mischaracterization of precedent and its failure to make a clear state-
ment on whether public policies that secure individual rights against
the state may be vindicated by the tort of wrongful discharge.225
These failings leave a measure of doctrinal instability in the law of
wrongful discharge and promise to confuse lawyers and judges who
handle wrongful discharge claims.
BENJAMIN S. HALEY
224. See supra notes 181-191 and accompanying text (arguing that the court should have
articulated the general categories into which cognizable wrongful discharge claims have
traditionally fit).
225. See supra notes 192-222 and accompanying text (discussing the court's mis-
characterization of Whoey and failure to make clear that constitutional rights against the
state cannot premise wrongful discharge actions against private employers).
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